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Abstract: Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a novel networking paradigm that provides 
enhanced programming abilities, which can be used to solve traditional security challenges on the 
basis of more efficient approaches. The most important element in the SDN paradigm is the 
controller, which is responsible for managing the flows of each correspondence forwarding element 
(switch or router). Flow statistics provided by the controller are considered to be useful information 
that can be used to develop a network-based intrusion detection system. Therefore, in this paper, 
we propose a 5-level hybrid classification system based on flow statistics in order to attain an 
improvement in the overall accuracy of the system. For the first level, we employ the k-Nearest 
Neighbor approach (kNN); for the second level, we use the Extreme Learning Machine (ELM); and 
for the remaining levels, we utilize the Hierarchical Extreme Learning Machine (H-ELM) approach. 
In comparison with conventional supervised machine learning algorithms based on the NSL-KDD 
benchmark dataset, the experimental study showed that our system achieves the highest level of 
accuracy (84.29%). Therefore, our approach presents an efficient approach for intrusion detection in 
SDNs. 
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence (AI); Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS); Software Defined 
Networks (SDN); Network Security. 
 
1. Introduction 
Software-defined networking (SDN) is the fruit of earlier proposals that mainly concerned both 
programmable networks and control-data planes’s separation [1]. In the SDN paradigm, the 
controller, which represents a logically centralized controlling point, successfully manages and 
gathers flow-based statistics via southbound interface such as OpenFlow protocol [2], which is 
maintained by Open Networking Foundation (ONF), a non-profit industry consortium that offers 
support and ensures various improvements in the SDN field [2]. In this paper, we aim to design an 
efficient Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in the SDN paradigm. Our goal is to correctly classify well-
known attacks alongside being able to detect new attacks on the basis of flow statistics provided by 
the controller. Flow-based intrusion detection approaches [3–5] depend only on the inspection of the 
packet header; therefore, they are considered to be computationally efficient in comparison with 
packet-based systems that require the analysis of the packet’s payload [6]. In addition, packet-based 
systems cannot be used when network traffic is encrypted [7]. Conversely, flow-based approaches 
cannot be utilized when the attack is embedded into the packet’s payload [8]. Therefore, packet and 
flow-based approaches can be employed together in order to achieve the highest level of protection 
[9–10]. Moreover, multi-layer approaches [11–15, 17, 18, 20–27] serve as a potential solution to 
enhance the overall accuracy of intrusion detection systems. In this paper, we utilize a multi-layer 
approach based on the K-Nearest Neighbor (kNN), the Extreme Learning Machine (ELM), and the 
Hierarchical Extreme Learning Machine (H-ELM) classification methods. Our contribution is four-
fold and can be summarized in the following manner: 
  
• Designing a multi-level hybrid approach that permits intrusion detection only on the basis 
of 6-flow features that can be easily obtained by a typical SDN controller. 
• Employing machine learning-based classification algorithms that reduce the time required 
for the testing stage, such as ELM and H-ELM. 
• Testing the system through the use of a standard dataset (NSL-KDD) that includes a set of 
new attacks that did not appear in the training dataset, in order to validate the effectiveness of our 
proposed system. 
• Accuracy improvements, from 75.75% to 84.29%, in comparison with well-known 
supervised machine learning approaches that employ the same 6-flow-based features and dataset. 
 
The rest of this work is organized in the following manner. Related work of multi-level IDS is 
presented in Section 2. The backgrounds of kNN, ELM, and H-ELM are introduced in Section 3. The 
proposed 5-level hybrid classification system is explained in detail in Section 4. The dataset used in 
training and testing stages is reviewed in Section 5. The experimental results are discussed in Section 
6. Evaluation metrics are introduced in Section 7. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 8. 
2. Related Work  
In [11], intrusions were classified through the use of a 3-level classification model based on C4.5 
algorithm. The first stage classifies the test data into their corresponding attack group (DOS, PROBE, 
Others or Normal). The second stage classifies “Others” into U2R and R2L groups. The third stage 
categorizes the attacks into a one specific attack type (e.g. back, land, etc.). The model achieved an 
88.3% accuracy level with considerably high false alarm rate that reached 11.158%. Detection rate for 
known attacks reached 84.312%. However, it reached 42.002% for unknown attacks, which is 
considered to be the main limitation for this model. 
MLIDS [12], on the other hand, achieved a high detection rate (99.986%) and minimized the false 
alarm rate to almost zero through the analysis of network traffic on the basis of three levels of 
granularities (rule-based flow analysis, protocol behavior analysis, and payload behavior analysis) 
and the utilization of an efficient fusion decision algorithm on the basis of least squares technique for 
each connection key and time-window. Since it includes a sliding time-window and payload analysis, 
it is likely to introduce a burden on the network, and therefore, it is used for the purpose of analysis. 
Abuadlla et al. [13] proposed a two-stage intrusion detection and classification method by taking 
advantage of two separate neural networks for each task. The first stage detects traffic anomalies 
whereas the next stage classifies the attacks as they occur. Experimental studies were conducted on 
the DARPA 1998 intrusion detection dataset. In the first stage, the detection rate reached 94.2% with 
a false alarm of 3.4%. Conversely, the second stage displayed a significantly high detection rate 
(99.42%) with a false alarm of 0.32%. The detection rate for known-attacks reached 99.97%, whereas 
it reached 78% for unknown attacks. It is worth noting that Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) with 
Levenberg-Marquardt takes less training time in comparison with Resilient Backpropagation 
alongside having low memory consumption in comparison with Radial Basis Function. Despite 
mainly using flow-based features that can easily be collected from traditional network routers 
through the utilization of standard protocols (NetFlow, Jflow, IPFIX) [13], this approach uses in its 
first stage (SYN - SYN/ACK) features, where it should inspect the header of each packet in order to 
extract related TCP flags, and therefore, it represents an expensive feature collection that, in turn, 
could be an additional burden on the network.  
Authors of [14] proposed a two-stage intrusion detection system with the employment of the 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) as an anomaly at the first stage and the Artificial Neural Network 
(ANN) as a misuse detector at the next stage. Experimental studies were conducted on the NSL-KDD 
intrusion detection dataset. The first stage classifies the network traffic into normal and attack groups. 
The next stage classifies the attack traffic into four attack groups. In the first stage, the detection rate 
reached 99.97% with a false alarm of 0.19%. Conversely, the second stage showed that the detection 
rate had reached 99.9% with a lower false alarm of 0.1%. Experimental results in this study reveal 
  
that misuse detection techniques are useful for the detection of known attacks with a low false 
positive rate. 
In another study, Amoli and Hamalainen [15] proposed a real-time multi-stage intrusion 
detection system in order to enhance the detection rate of unknown attacks. The first stage detects 
potential attacks by monitoring a set of traffic features that include the size and number of bytes, 
packets, and network flows. The second stage, alternatively, finds the similarities with previous 
communications established by the intruders. If the number of any of the previously mentioned 
features crosses the threshold, a specific time slot will be flagged as anomaly. In order to increase the 
detection rate, the system monitors the rate of time difference between each packet (TDP) and 
network flows (TDF). Sub-space clustering is used to unsupervisedly cluster the previously flagged 
traffic, which allows the differentiation of normal traffic through the detection of the outliers with 
lower processing time and complexity in comparison with multidimensional clustering algorithms 
[15]. After obtaining several two-dimensional clusters, DBSCAN [16] is used for to create the proper 
clusters and to identify the outliers. The second stage is designed to discover potential similarities 
between intruders, which would be able to find the Bost-Master in case of Botnet attacks. To this end, 
past hour records of related network traffic should be stored. It is obvious that the system includes 
the use of multiple time windows and therefore, could negatively affect the performance of the 
controller if it is considered to be used in the SDN paradigm.  
Aziz et al. [17] proposed a three-stage hybrid intelligent approach. The first stage employs the 
principal component analysis (PCA) method for feature selection, selecting 22 out of 41 features from 
the NSL-KDD benchmark dataset. The second stage applies genetic algorithm in order to generate 
anomaly detectors that are used to identify normal and anomalous behaviors. The last layer utilizes 
different classifiers (Naive bayes, MLP neural network, and decision trees) in order to increase the 
detection accuracy. The experimental studies showed that naive bayes classifier has better accuracy 
in detecting U2R and R2L attacks. Conversely, the J48 decision tree classifier achieves a good accuracy 
(82%) in detecting DoS attacks and 65.4% in detecting probe attacks. 
Cordella et al. [18] proposed a serial multi-stage intrusion detection system on the basis of the 
Learning Vector Quantization (LVQ) classifiers, where the authors use the reliability concept [19] in 
order to assist the decision making at each stage. In case of low reliability, the system will not raise 
an alert which, in turn, will aid the reduction of the false alarm rate. A connection will be declared as 
normal traffic only if all stages do not detect any attack. The first stage distinguishes between normal 
traffic and the attacks belong to DoS or Probe classes. The second stage discriminates between normal 
traffic and R2L attacks. And finally, the last stage classifies the network traffic into normal and U2R 
attack classes. The overall error and missed detection reached 0.68% and 0.67% respectively. 
Gogoi et al. [20] proposed a three-level intrusion detection system that utilized a combination of 
supervised, unsupervised, and outlier-based techniques for the enhancement of detection accuracy. 
The first level classifies test data into three classes: DoS, Probe, and Rest (unclassified), on the basis 
of an improved version of the CatSub algorithm [21]. The next level categorizes the Rest into Normal 
and Rest classes depending upon the k-point algorithm [22]. The last level splits the Rest into U2R 
and R2L classes. The data of the U2R class were extracted from the Rest class through the employment 
of an outlier-based classifier [23]. The remaining records in the Rest class were classified as R2L. The 
efficiency of this model was demonstrated by experimental studies conducted on four datasets, 
namely TUIDS (packet and flow level), DDoS, KDD Cup 99, and NSL-KDD. It is worth observing 
that the system was able to achieve high accuracy reaching 99.3%, 99.2%, 98.901%, 97.568%, and 
98.394% on the TUIDS-packet, TUIDS-flow, DDoS, KDD Cup 99, and NSL-KDD datasets 
respectively. Alternatively, false positive rate on the previously mentioned datasets reached 0.0108%, 
1.36%, 0.3505%, 9.933%, and 1.585% respectively. 
Reddy and Achary [24] proposed a two-stage system on the basis of a combination of rule-based 
classifier and K-means clustering. Experimental results based on the KDD Cup 99 dataset displayed 
a good accuracy reaching 83.96%. Lee et al. [25] proposed a multi-stage agent-based intrusion 
detection system that utilizes the Hidden Markov Model (HMM). Based on experimental studies 
conducted on the DARPA 2000 intrusion detection dataset, detection rates were higher than 90% and 
  
duration times were below 30 ms. Rajeswari and Kannan [26] proposed a multi-stage system on the 
basis of the enhanced C4.5 algorithm. Detection rate based on the KDD Cup 99 dataset reached 
62.33%, with a 9.1% false- alarm rate. 
Araki et al. [27] employed a multi-stage One-Class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM) system 
to detect sophisticated unknown attacks, wherein the system makes use of three sets of traffic, two 
sets retrieved from a dataset and one extracted from the real network. At the first stage, the OC-SVM 
learns from older archive sets and later analyzes a newer set and one from the real network. At the 
second stage, the OC-SVM learns the outliers from the newer set and utilizes them in order to analyze 
the outliers of the real network. The detection rate and the false positive rate reached 80.00% and 
20.94% respectively. 
Al-Yaseen el al. [29] proposed a multi-level hybrid system on the basis of SVM and ELM. Based 
on experimental results conducted on the KDD Cup 99 dataset, the system showed high accuracy 
(95.75%) and low false alarm rate (1.87%). Casas et al. [29] proposed a three-step clustering technique 
on the basis of sub-space density clustering in order to detect outlying flows where they use the 
following features: number of source/destination IP addresses and ports, ratio of number of sources 
to number of destinations, packet rate, fraction of ICMP and SYN packets, and average packet size. 
The first step detects anomalous time slots in which the analysis be conducted. The next step 
identifies and ranks the outlying flows according to the degree of abnormality on the basis of a 
combination of sub-space clustering [30], DBSCAN [16], and evidence accumulation clustering [31]. 
Thereafter, the top-ranked flows are considered as anomalies on the basis of a thresholding approach. 
The approach proposed by Casas et al. [29] displayed a better performance in comparison with other 
unsupervised anomaly detection methods such as DBSCAN, k-means, and PCA. However, since it 
extracts some TCP flags such as SYN, it may not be appropriate for the SDN case due to the fact that 
dealing with flows is more fast and efficient than handling each packet separately.  
Previously discussed studies depend mainly on the use of the whole dataset that probably 
contains different features (basic features, time-related features, connection-related features, content-
related features, host-related features, and login attempts-related features). Using all these features, 
however, may not be the best choice for designing a network-based IDS in the SDN paradigm. 
Recently, a flow-based deep learning approach [32] has been proposed for the purpose of intrusion 
detection in SDNs, where the system achieved a good accuracy reaching 75.75% only on the basis of 
6-flow features. The same features also are used in our proposed system. The usage of flow-based 
features is considered straightforward and very effective in the SDN architecture where the SDN 
controller is already able to obtain such features without any need for a preprocessing or flow 
aggregation step. In this study, we show that our proposed system, which employs a flow-based 
multi-level approach, can achieve better results as compared by [32] and other conventional 
supervised learning approaches.  
3. Theoretical Background 
In this section, we introduce the theoretical background of the algorithms used in our proposed 
system. Therefore, we describe in details the following algorithms: kNN, ELM, and H-ELM. 
3.1. K-Nearest Neighbor algorithm (kNN) 
 K-Nearest Neighbor algorithm (kNN) classifies the new instances that exist in a given dataset 
according to their closest training instances in the feature space [33]. kNN is a straightforward 
algorithm and displays a good robustness against noisy training data or a large dataset [34]. It is 
worth mentioning that kNN and its variants [35–39] are used widely in malware detection [40, 41], 
intrusion detection [42–45], and spam detection [46]. Typically, the algorithm finds the  closest 
instances based on a calculation of the distance between the new instances and all training instances. 
For instance, let X and Y be two feature vectors with dimension n. The Euclidian distance between 
these two feature vectors is defined below 
 𝑑𝑋𝑌 = max(|𝑋𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖|) , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑛        (1) 
  
The new instance is classified based on the majority vote of its k nearest instances. Therefore, it will 
be assigned to the class whose labels are the most frequent. Other distance metrics such as Manhattan, 
Mahalanobis, Chebyshev, Minkowski, and Hamming can be utilized as well. The performance of 
kNN is affected by the distance metric used by the algorithm alongside the choice of the optimal 
value of the parameter k [47]. A small k increases the impact of individual cases. A large k, however, 
increases the robustness of the noise provided in the dataset [48]. The value of k is commonly 
determined through the employment of cross-validation or adaptive approaches [49]. In this study, 
we use the standard version of this algorithm by using the Euclidian distance as the distance metric 
and applying cross-validation in order to determine the optimal value of parameter k. kNN algorithm 
is used in the first layer of our proposed model in order model for the detection of DoS attacks. 
3.2. Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) 
The Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) [50] represents a new learning paradigm built on basis of the 
concept of single-hidden layer-feed-forward neural network. ELM requires short training and testing 
time in comparison with traditional feed-forward networks owing to the fact that the parameters of 
its hidden layer are randomly chosen, thereby eliminating the need for the training stage [51-53]. 
ELM achieved high accuracy for multi-level IDS as compared with SVM [52]. Kernel-based ELM 
outperformed neural networks approaches for detecting Probe attacks in a multi-level IDS model 
[53]. For a given data set 𝑍 {(𝑥1, 𝑡1), (𝑥2, 𝑡2), … , (𝑥1, 𝑡1) ∶ 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁}, where 𝑥𝑖 = [𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑛]
𝑇 ∈
𝑅𝑛  and 𝑥𝑖 = [𝑥𝑖1 , 𝑥𝑖2, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑚]
𝑇 ∈ 𝑅𝑚 , which is the label of instances, a single-hidden layer feed-
forward neural network (SLFN) with n inputs, m outputs, k hidden neurons, and activation function 
g(x) can be written as 
∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑔(𝑤𝑖
𝑇𝑥𝑗 + 𝑏𝑖) = 𝑡,   𝑗 = 1, . . , 𝑁
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
 
(2) 
where 𝑤𝑖 = [𝑤𝑖1, 𝑤𝑖2, … , 𝑤𝑖𝑛]
𝑇  is the weight vector between the i-th hidden neuron and the input 
neurons, 𝛽𝑖 = [𝛽𝑖1, 𝛽𝑖2, … , 𝛽𝑖𝑛]
𝑇 is the weight vector between the i-th hidden neuron and the outputs, 
and 𝑏𝑖 is the threshold of the i-th hidden neuron. The above equation can be written as 
𝐻𝛽 = 𝑇          (3) 
where 
𝐻 =  [
𝑔(𝑤1
𝑇𝑥1 + 𝑏1) ⋯ 𝑔(𝑤𝑘
𝑇𝑥1 + 𝑏𝑘)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑔(𝑤1
𝑇𝑥𝑁 + 𝑏1) ⋯ 𝑔(𝑤𝑘
𝑇𝑥𝑁 + 𝑏𝑘)
]   
 
𝛽 = [
𝛽1
𝑇
⋮
𝛽𝑘
𝑇
] and    𝑇 = [
𝑡1
𝑇
⋮
𝑡𝑘
𝑇
] 
The output weights of ELM are obtained by determining a solution that achieves the least squares 
error of the linear system. The unique smallest norm least-squares solution can be obtained by 
?̂? =  𝐻†𝑇          (4) 
where 𝐻† represents the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of matrix H. The Moore-Penrose 
generalized inverse can be calculated by utilizing different approaches such as the orthogonal 
projection method, iterative method, and singular value decomposition [54]. On the basis of ridge 
regression theory and the fact that the number of training samples is far bigger than the 
  
dimensionality of the feature space, it is better to add a positive value to the diagonal of 𝐻𝑇𝑇 , which 
provides a better generalization performance as shown numerically in [55]. 
β̂ =  (
I
C
+ HTH)
−1
HTT        (5) 
where C is a positive constant. For binary classification, the decision function can be written in the 
manner shown below 
𝑓(𝑥) =  sign (ℎ(𝑥) (
I
C
+ HTH)
−1
HTT)      (6) 
ELM is used in the second layer of our multi-level system to efficiently detect the Probe attacks. 
3.3. Hierarchical Extreme Learning Machine (H-ELM) 
The Hierarchical Extreme Learning Machine (H-ELM) [56] was proposed in order to achieve a 
better generalization with faster convergence in comparison with the fundamental ELM approach. 
H-ELM training is structurally divided into two stages: (i) unsupervised hierarchical feature 
representation and (ii) supervised feature classification. First, the input instances should be converted 
into an ELM feature space, which may help in the extraction of hidden information from training 
instances. Then, high-level sparse features are obtained by applying M-layer unsupervised learning 
stage. The output of each hidden layer is defined as 
Hi = 𝑔(𝐻𝑖−1 ∙ 𝛽)         (7) 
 
where H𝑖 is the output of the i-th hidden layer 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝐾] , H𝑖−1 is the output of the (i-1) th hidden 
layer, g(.) represents the activation function of the hidden layers, and β denotes the output weights. 
After extracting the features of the previous layer, the parameters of the current hidden layer will 
remain fixed [56]. H-ELM employs random projections of extracted features as the inputs of the 
feature classification stage. ℓ1  penalty is applied to produce sparser and more significant 
information. The input weights of the ELM sparse autoencoder are obtained by searching the path 
from a random mapped feature space [56]. The autoencoder enjoys universal approximation 
capability and sparsity constraint is added to the optimization model, which is written as 
Oβ =  argmin
β
(‖Hβ − X‖2 + ‖β‖ℓ1)      (8) 
where X denotes the input data, H represents the random mapping output, and β is the hidden layer 
weight. A fast iterative shrinkage-thresholding algorithm (FISTA) [57] is used in order to solve Eq. 
(6). As mentioned before, the supervised training stage is implemented by the original ELM, which 
is already explained in section 3.2. H-ELM is used in the third, fourth, and fifth layers of our proposed 
system in order to detect U2R, R2L, and unknown attacks respectively. 
4. Proposed Multi-Level Hybrid IDS 
In this section, we present our proposed system. The system is inspired by the study presented 
in [52], which uses a five-level classification model based on a combination of SVM and ELM 
algorithms. As shown in Figure 1, DoS and Probe attacks are detected prior to other categories. This 
is due to the fact that both DoS and Probe attacks have lower similarity in comparison with other 
attack types [20]. Conversely, both U2R and R2L attacks are relatively similar to the normal traffic 
patterns [20] and therefore, both of them present a potential threat that need to be detected before the 
normal traffic [58].  
  
 
Figure 1. Multi-level hybrid IDS proposed in [52] 
 
Similar to the model presented in [52], our proposed system uses one classifier per layer. As 
shown in Figure 2, the second layer remains the same where ELM achieves better performance as 
compared to other approaches such as SVM and neural networks [51, 53]. In the next layers, we 
replace the SVM with H-ELM, which is faster than SVM and performs a better generalization in 
comparison with SVM and other approaches [51–53]. It is worth noting that in our model we use 6-
flow features instead of the 41 traffic-features used in [52], not to mention that our experimental study 
is conducted on the basis of the NSL-KDD, which is an enhanced version of the KDD Cup 1999. 
 
 
Figure 2. The architecture of our proposed IDS 
 
At each layer, the training dataset is spilt into two categories: the first one represents a specific 
attack type and “Other” category, which represents a normal traffic or an attack that has to be 
detected by the next layer. Therefore, the model uses five datasets and utilizes the one-versus-all 
training approach. In the first layer, we use the kNN approach instead of the SVM due to its 
robustness against noisy training data [34]. 
5. Dataset and Selected Features 
As mentioned in the previous sections, in this study, we use the NSL-KDD dataset. The NSL-
KDD is an enhanced version of the KDD Cup 99 dataset that suffers from a huge number of 
  
redundant records [59]. The NSL-KDD dataset includes the features shown in Table 1. We use 
features number F1, F2, F5, F6, F23, and F24. The reason for selecting these features is that we can 
obtain them easily from the SDN controller [32], and therefore can be a good choice for SDNs. 
Table 1. List of features of NSL-KDD dataset. 
F# Feature name F# Feature name F# Feature name 
F1 Duration F15 Su attempted F29 Same srv rate 
F2 Protocol type F16 Num root F30 Diff srv rate 
F3 Service F17 Num file creations F31 Srv diff host rate 
F4 Flag F18 Num shells F32 Dst host count 
F5 Source bytes F19 Num access files F33 Dst host srv count 
F6 Destination bytes F20 Num outbound cmds F34 Dst host same srv rate 
F7 Land F21 Is host login F35 Dst host diff srv rate 
F8 Wrong fragment F22 Is guest login F36 Dst host same src port rate 
F9 Urgent F23 Count F37 Dst host srv diff host rate 
F10 Hot F24 Srv count F38 Dst host serror rate 
F11 Number failed logins F25 Serror rate F39 Dst host srv serror rate 
F12 Logged in F26 Srv serror rate F40 Dst host rerror rate 
F13 Num compromised F27 Rerror rate F41 Dst host srv rerror rate 
F14 Root shell F28 Srv rerror rate F42 Class label 
 
The NSL-KDD dataset contains a total of 39 attacks wherein each attack is classified into one of 
the following four categories: DoS, R2L, U2R and Probe. In addition, a set of these attacks is added 
to the testing set. Table 2 presents the distribution of the known and new attack records in the NSL-
KDD testing set. 
Table 2. Distributions of known and new attacks in KDD-Test set. 
 DoS R2L U2R Probe 
Known attacks 
5741 2199 37 1106 
76.98% 79.85% 18.50% 45.68% 
New attacks 
1717 555 163 1315 
23.02% 20.15% 81.50% 54.32% 
 
6. Evaluation Metrics 
The performance of our multi-level flow-based system is evaluated in terms of accuracy and 
False Alarm Rate (FAR), where the accuracy is calculated as 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
(𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃)
 
 (9) 
True Positives (TP) is the number of attack instances correctly classified; True Negatives (TN) is the 
number of normal traffic instances correctly classified; False Positives (FP) is the number of normal 
traffic instances falsely classified; and False Negatives (FN) is number of attack instances falsely 
classified. Conversely, false alarm rate is calculated by 
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
 
(10) 
In addition, we calculate Precision, Recall, and F-measure, which are obtained as 
  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
 
(11) 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
(12) 
 
𝐹 − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 = 2 ×
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙)
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙)
 
(13) 
 
Precision reveals the percentage of attacks detected by an IDS that are actual attacks. Recall indicates 
the percentage of detected attacks versus all attacks presented in the NSL-KDD dataset. F-measure 
represents a more balanced measure by considering both precision and recall [32]. 
7. Experimental Results 
The experiment study was conducted on an Intel i5 machine with 12 GB of RAM. Table 3 shows 
the parameters used for each classifier employed at each layer. 
Table 3. Parameters used for each classifier at each layer 
Layer Classifier Parameter (s) 
1 kNN   K = 65  
2 ELM  N = 400  
3 H-ELM N1 = 40 N2 = 40  N3= 200 
4 H-ELM N1 = 10 N2 = 10 N3 = 300 
5 H-ELM N1 = 10 N2= 10 N3 = 200 
 
We divided our experimental study into two experiments: 1) evaluation of the performance at 
each layer and 2) comparison with other supervised machine learning approaches. The first 
experiment basically evaluated the performance of the model. Table 4 shows the accuracy and the 
false alarm rate achieved at each layer. 
Table 4. Results for training and testing stages achieved at each layer of our proposed system 
Layer Classifier 
Detected 
Attack 
Training Stage Testing Stage 
Accuracy  
(%) 
False 
Alarm  
Rate (%) 
Accuracy  
(%) 
False 
Alarm  
Rate (%) 
1 kNN DoS 97.34 1.38 91.23 3.39 
2 ELM Probe 97.12 0.12 92.61 1.45 
3 H-ELM U2R 99.96 0.0024 99 0.12 
4 H-ELM R2L 99.19 0.0240 86.97 0.94 
5 H-ELM Unknown 90.76 7.28 80.39 5.61 
 
All layers 
kNN + ELM + 
H-ELM 
 
All types 
 
94.11 
 
7.89 
 
84.29 
 
6.3 
 
In the second experiment, we compared our proposed system with other conventional 
supervised learning approaches such as Naive Bayes, Neural Networks, SVM, and Decision Trees. 
As displayed in Table 5, our system achieves the highest values of accuracy, recall, and F1-score. In 
terms of false positive rate, it is worth mentioning that the H-ELM approach achieves the highest 
precision with the lowest false alarm rate. Compared with [32], our system achieved a higher 
  
accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score. However, in terms of false alarm rate, [32] achieved better 
results. 
Table 5. Comparing our proposed approach with other approaches 
 
Method 
Accuracy 
(%) 
False 
Alarm 
Rate (%) 
Precision 
(%) 
Recall  
(%) 
F1-score 
(%) 
Naive Bayes 49.88 5.14 80.28 15.83 26.45 
Neural Network 63.70 7.66 87.88 42.02 56.86 
SVM 71.40 10.63 87.79 57.80 69.71 
Decision Trees 74.43 6.43 92.50 59.95 72.75 
ELM (N=1500) 74.80 10.17 89.18 63.43 74.13 
Deep Neural Network [32] 75.75 3.21 83 76 75 
kNN 77.09 4.07 95.33 62.84 75.75 
H-ELM 
(N1=30,N2=30,N3=300) 
77.59 2.57 96.98 62.59 76.08 
H-ELM 
(N1=10,N2=10,N3=200) 
80.39 5.61 94.26 69.80 80.21 
Our Approach 84.29 6.3 94.18 77.18 84.83 
 
We also used the Cbench tool in order to evaluate the throughput of our system. Therefore, we 
implemented the system as a module of POX controller in the SDN’s control plane. This approach is 
considered more efficient than the implementation of the system as an application of the controller 
due to the fact that our 6-flow features can be easily obtained by the controller, and increasing number 
of flows will dramatically increase the interaction between the controller and the application. 
Previously mentioned features were collected periodically every 10 seconds. Each Open vSwich was 
connected to 1000 virtual hosts with different MAC addresses, sending 10000 (Packet-In) messages 
to the POX controller. Compared with the basic forwarding module, our system achieved an 
acceptable performance as presented in Figure 3. This is owing to the fact that we use only 6-flow 
features that can easily be obtained from the controller and employ machine learning algorithms that 
reduce the time required for the testing stage such as ELM and H-ELM in the layers from 2 to 5. 
 
Figure 3. The throughput of our proposed IDS and the basic forwarding module 
  
In brief, our experimental study showed that both common supervised and deep neural network 
[32] approaches may not always achieve the best results, and that the usage of alternative methods 
such as multi-level systems could be investigated in order to attain the required results. Second, 
achieving good results through a multi-level approach does not guarantee good results in terms of 
detecting unknown attacks such as the results obtained from [52]. Third, achieving a high accuracy 
through a multi-level system may be accompanied by an increased number of false alarms, which is 
observed in our proposed system.  
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed an efficient multi-level hybrid intrusion detection method for SDNs. The 
system was designed on the basis of a combination of kNN, ELM, and H-ELM approaches. The 
experimental study conducted on NSL-KDD dataset showed that our approach significantly 
enhanced the overall accuracy. Our future work will be focused on improving the system in order to 
achieve a lower false alarm rate. 
 
References 
 
1. Jarraya, Y.; Madi, T.; Debbabi, M. A survey and a layered taxonomy of software-defined networking. IEEE 
COMMUN SURV TUT, 2014, 16, 1955-1980, 10.1109/COMST.2014.2320094. 
2. McKeown, N.; Anderson, T.; Balakrishnan, H.; Parulkar, G.; Peterson, L.; Rexford, J.; Shenker, S.; Turner, J. 
OpenFlow: enabling innovation in campus networks. ACM SIGCOMM COMP COM, 2008, 38, 69-74, 
10.1145/1355734.1355746 
3. Kim, M.S.; Kong, H.J.; Hong, S.C.; Chung, S.H.; Hong, J. A flow-based method for abnormal network traffic 
detection. In Proc of IEEE/ IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS), Seoul, South 
Korea, 23-23 April 2004; pp. 599–612. 
4. Lakhina, A.; Crovella M.; Diot C. Mining anomalies using traffic feature distributions. In: Proc of ACM 
SIGCOMM, NY, USA, August 22-26 2005; pp. 217–228. 
5. Brauckhoff, D.; May, M.; Plattner B. Flow-Level anomaly detection – blessing or curse?. In: Proc of IEEE 
INFOCOM Workshop, Alaska, USA, 6-12 May 2007; pp. 1-2. 
6. Umer, M.F.; Sher, M.; Bi. Y. Flow-based intrusion detection: techniques and challenges. Computers & 
Security, 2017, 70, 238-254, 10.1016/j.cose.2017.05.009 
7. Koch, R. Towards next-generation intrusion detection. In: Proc of IEEE 3rd International Conference on 
Cyber Conflict (ICCC), Tallinn, Estonia, 7-10 June 2011; pp. 1-18. 
8. Sperotto, A.; Pras, A.: Flow-based intrusion detection. In: Proc of IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on 
Integrated Network Management, Dublin, Ireland, 23-27 May 2011; pp. 958-963. 
9. Sperotto, A.; Schaffrath, G.; Sadre, R.; Morariu, C.; Pras, A.; Stiller, B. An overview of ip flow-based 
intrusion detection. IEEE COMMUN SURV TUT, 2010, 12, 343–356, 10.1109/SURV.2010.032210.00054 
10. Golling, M.; R. Hofstede, R.; Koch, R. Towards multi-layered intrusion detection in high-speed networks. 
In: Proc of: IEEE 6th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon 2014), Tallinn, Estonia, 3-6 June 
2014; pp. 191–206. 
11. Xiang, C.; Chong, M.Y.; Zhu, H.L. Design of multiple-level tree classifiers for intrusion detection system. 
In Proc. of IEEE Conference on Cybernetics and Intelligent Systems, CT, USA, 28-28 Sept. 2005; pp. 873-
878. 
12. Al-Nashif, Y.; Kumar, A.A.; Hariri, S; Luo, Y.; Szidarovsky, F.; Qu. G. Multi-level intrusion detection system 
(ML-IDS). In: Proc of IEEE International Conference on Autonomic Computing (ICAC'08), Chicago, USA, 
2-6 June 2008; pp. 131-140. 
13. Abuadlla, Y.; Kvascev, G.; Gajin, S.; Jovanovic, Z. Flow-based anomaly intrusion detection system using 
two neural network stages. Computer Science and Information Systems, 2014, 11, 601-622, 
10.2298/CSIS130415035A 
14. Hussain, J.; Lalmuanawma, S.; Chhakchhuak, L. A two-stage hybrid classification technique for network 
intrusion detection system. International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems, 2016, 9, 863-875, 
10.1080/18756891.2016.1237186 
  
15. Amoli, P.V.; Hamalainen, T. Real time multi stage unsupervised intelligent engine for NIDS to enhance 
detection rate of unknown attacks. In: Proc of IEEE 3rd International Conference on Information Science 
and Technology (ICIST), Yangzhou, China, 23-25 March 2013; pp. 702-706. 
16. Ester, M.; Kriegel, H.P.; Sander J.; Xu, X. A density-based algorithm for discovering clusters in large spatial 
databases with noise. In: Proc. of Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Knowledge 
Discovery and Data Mining (KDD-96), Portland, USA, 02-04 August 1996; pp. 226–23. 
17. Aziz, A.S.A.; Hassanien, A.E.; Hanaf, S.E.O. Tolba, M.F. Multi-layer hybrid machine learning techniques 
for anomalies detection and classification approach. In Proc. of IEEE 13th International Conference on 
Hybrid Intelligent Systems (HIS), Gammarth, Tunisia, 4-6 Dec. 2013; pp. 215-220. 
18. Cordella, L.P.; Sansone, C. A multi-stage classification system for detecting intrusions in computer 
networks. Pattern analysis and applications, 2007, 10, 83-100, 10.1007/s10044-006-0053-7 
19. Cordella, L.P.; Sansone, C. Tortorella, F.; Vento, M.; De Stefano, C. Neural networks classification reliability, 
Academic press theme volumes on neural network systems. Techniques and applications, Leondes CT.; Academic 
Press: London, UK, 1997; pp. 161–199.  
20. Gogoi, P.; Bhattacharyya, D.K.; Borah, B.; Kalita J.K. MLH-IDS: a multi-level hybrid intrusion detection 
method. COMPUT J, 2013, 57, 602-623, 10.1093/comjnl/bxt044 
21. Borah, B.; Bhattacharyya, D.K. Catsub: a technique for clustering categorical data based on subspace. ICFAI 
J. Comput. Sci., 2008, II, 7–20. 
22. Gogoi, P., Borah, B.; Bhattacharyya, D.K. Network anomaly detection using unsupervised model. 
International Journal of Computer Applications, 2011, Spec. Issue Network Security and Cryptography, 19–30. 
23. Jin, W.; Tung, A.K.H.; Han, J.; Wang, W. Ranking Outliers Using Symmetric Neighborhood Relationship. 
In: Proc. 10th Pacific-Asia Conf. Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (PAKDD), Singapore, 
Singapore, 9-12 April 2006; pp. 577–593. 
24. Reddy, N.V.S.; U. D. Acharya, U.D. A Two-stage Hybrid Model for Intrusion Detection. In Proc. of IEEE 
International Conference on Advanced Computing and Communications (ADCOM 2006), Surathkal, India, 
20-23 Dec. 2006; pp. 163-165. 
25. Lee, D.H.; Kim, D.Y.; Jung, J.I. Multi-stage intrusion detection system using hidden markov model 
algorithm. In: Proc. of IEEE International Conference on Information Science and Security (ICISS), Seoul, 
South Korea, 10-12 Jan. 2008; pp. 72-77. 
26. Rajeswari, L.P.; Kannan, A. An Intrusion Detection System based on multiple level hybrid classifier using 
enhanced C4.5. In: Proc. of IEEE International Conference on Signal Processing, Communications and 
Networking (ICSCN'08), Chennai, India, 4-6 Jan. 2008; pp. 75-79. 
27. Araki, S.; Yamaguchi, Y. Shimada, H.; Takakura, H. Unknown Attack Detection by Multistage One-Class 
SVM Focusing on Communication Interval. In Proc. of International Conference on Neural Information 
Processing, Kuching, Malaysia, 3-6 Nov. 2014; pp. 325-332. 
28. Casas, P.; Mazel, J.; Owezarski, P. Unada: Unsupervised network anomaly detection using sub-space 
outliers ranking. In Proc. of 10th International IFIP TC 6 Networking Conference, Valencia, Spain, 9-13 May 
2011; pp. 40-51. 
29. Al-Yaseen, W.L.; Othman, Z.A.; Nazri, M.Z.A. Multi-level hybrid support vector machine and extreme 
learning machine based on modified K-means for intrusion detection system. EXPERT SYST APPL, 2017, 
67, 296-303. 
30. Parsons, L.; Haque E.; Liu, H. Subspace Clustering for High Dimensional Data: A Review. ACM SIGKDD 
Explorations Newsletter, 2004, 6, 90–105, 10.1145/1007730.1007731 
31. Fred, A.; Jain, A.K. Combining Multiple Clusterings Using Evidence Accumulation. IEEE Trans. Pattern 
Anal. and Machine Int. 2005, 27, 835-50, 10.1109/TPAMI.2005.113 
32. Tang, T.A.; Mhamdi, L.; McLernon, D.; Zaidi S.A.R.; M. Ghogho, M. Deep Learning Approach for Network 
Intrusion Detection in Software Defined Networking. In: Proc. International Conf. on Wireless Networks 
and Mobile Communications, Fez, Morocco, 26-29 Oct. 2016; pp. 258-263. 
33. Belur V. Dasarathy. Nearest Neighbor (NN) norms: NN Pattern Classification Techniques, IEEE Computer 
Society Press: Los Alamitos, California, 1990; pp. 1- 550. 
34. Bhattacharya, G.; K. Ghosh, K. Chowdhury, A.S. An affinity-based new local distance function and 
similarity measure for kNN algorithm. PATTERN RECOGN LETT, 2012, 33, 356-363, 
10.1016/j.patrec.2011.10.021 
  
35. Li, Y.; L. Guo, L. An active learning based TCM-KNN algorithm for supervised network intrusion 
detection. COMPUT SECUR, 2007, 26, 459-467, 10.1016/j.cose.2007.10.002 
36. Kuang, L.; Zulkernine, M. An anomaly intrusion detection method using the CSI-KNN algorithm. In: Proc. 
of the 2008 ACM symposium on Applied computing, Fortaleza, Brazil, 16-20 March 2008; pp. 921-926. 
37. Holmes, C.C.; Adams, N.M. A probabilistic nearest neighbour method for statistical pattern recognition. J 
R STAT SOC, 2002, 64, pp. 295-306, 10.1111/1467-9868.00338 
38. Guvenir, H.A.; Akkus, A. Weighted k nearest neighbor classification on feature projections. In Proc. of the 
12th International Symposium on Computer and Information Sciences, Vancouver, Canada, 24-29 July 
2016; pp. 44-51. 
39. Hastie, T.; Tibshirani, R. Discriminant adaptive nearest neighbor classification. IEEE T PATTERN ANAL, 
1996, 18, 607-616, 10.1109/34.506411 
40. Alazab, M.; Venkatraman, S.; Watters, P.; Alazab, M. Zero-day malware detection based on supervised 
learning algorithms of API call signatures. In: Proc. of the Ninth Australasian Data Mining Conference, 
Ballarat, Australia, 1-2 December 24 2011; pp. 171-182. 
41. Santos, I.; Penya, Y.K. Devesa, J.; Bringas, P.G. N-grams-based File Signatures for Malware Detection. 11th 
International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems (ICEIS), Milan, Italy, 6-10 May 2009; pp. 317-
320. 
42. Li, W.; Yi, P.; Wu, Y.; Pan, L.; Li, J. A new intrusion detection system based on KNN classification algorithm 
in wireless sensor network. Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2014, 2014, 1-8, 
10.1155/2014/240217 
43. Damopoulos, D.; Menesidou, S.A.; Kambourakis, G.; Papadaki, M.; Clarke, N.; Gritzalis, S. Evaluation of 
anomaly‐based IDS for mobile devices using machine learning classifiers. Security and Communication 
Networks, 2012, 5, 3-14, 10.1002/sec.341 
44. Liao, Y.; Vemuri, V.R. Using text categorization techniques for intrusion detection. In: Proc. of 11th USENIX 
Security Symposium, San Francisco, USA, 5-9 August 2002; pp. 51-59. 
45. Liao, Y.; Vemuri, V.R. Use of k-nearest neighbor classifier for intrusion detection. COMPUT SECUR, 2002, 
21, 439-448, 10.1016/S0167-4048(02)00514-X 
46. Firte, L.; Lemnaru, C.; Potolea. R. Spam detection filter using KNN algorithm and resampling. In Proc. of 
IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Computer Communication and Processing (ICCP), 
ClujNapoca, Romania, 26-28 Aug. 2010; pp. 27-33. 
47. Parvin, H.; Alizadeh, H.; Minaes-Bidgoli, B. MKNN: Modified k-nearest neighbor. In: Proc. of World 
Congress on Engineering and Computer Science (WCECS), Yantai, China, 10-12 Aug. 2010; pp. 91-94. 
48. Anbeek, P.; Vincken, K.L.; Van Osch, M.J.; Bisschops, R.H.; Van Der Grond, J. Probabilistic segmentation 
of white matter lesions in MR imaging, NeuroImage, 2004, 21, 1037-1044, 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.10.012 
49. Wettschereck, D.; Dietterich, T.G. Locally adaptive nearest neighbor algorithms. Advances in Neural 
Information Processing Systems, 1994, 6, 184-191. 
50. Huang, G., Zhu, Q.-Y., Siew, C.-K. Extreme Learning Machine: A New Learning Scheme of Feedforward 
Neural Networks. In: Proc. of IEEE International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, Budapest, 
Hungary, 25-29 July 2004; pp. 985–990. 
51. Cheng, C.; Tay, C.; W.P.; Huang, G.B. Extreme learning machines for intrusion detection. In: Proc of WCCI 
2012 IEEE World Congress on Computational Intelligence, Brisbane, Australia, 10-15 June 2012; pp. 1–8. 
52. Al-Yaseen, W.L.; Othman, Z.A.; Nazri, M.Z.A. Multi-level hybrid support vector machine and extreme 
learning machine based on modified K-means for intrusion detection system. EXPERT SYST APPL, 2017, 
67, 296-303, 10.1016/j.eswa.2016.09.041 
53. Singh, R.; Kumar, H.; Singla, R.K. An Intrusion Detection System using Network Traffic Profiling and 
Online Sequential Extreme Learning Machine. EXPERT SYST APPL, 2015, 42, 1–16, 
10.1016/j.eswa.2015.07.015 
54. Rao, C.R; Mitra, S.K. Generalized Inverse of Matrices and Its Applications, John Wiley & Sons Inc: NY, USA, 
1972; pp. 1-240. 
55. Huang, G.B.; Wang, D.H.; Lan, Y. Extreme learning machines: A survey. International Journal of Machine 
Learning and Cybernetics, 2011, 2, 107–122, 10.1007/s13042-011-0019-y 
56. Tang, J.; C. Deng, C.; Huang, G.B. Extreme learning machine for multilayer perceptron. IEEE T NEUR NET 
LEAR, 2016, 27, 809-821, 10.1109/TNNLS.2015.2424995 
  
57. Beck, A.; Teboulle. M. A fast iterative shrinkage-thresholding algorithm for linear inverse problems. SIAM 
J IMAGING SCI, 2009, 2, 183–202, 10.1137/080716542 
58. Sharma, N.; Mukherjee, S. A novel multi-classifier layered approach to improve minority attack detection 
in IDS. PROC TECH, 2012, 6, 913-921, 10.1016/j.protcy.2012.10.111 
59. Tavallaee, M.; Bagheri, E.; Lu, W.; Ghorbani, A.A. A detailed analysis of the KDD CUP 99 data set. In: Proc. 
IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence for Security and Defense Applications, Ottawa, Canada, 
8-10 July 2009; pp. 1-6. 
